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Many interesting aspects of gender discrimination concern the interaction of an
applicant’s gender and quality. Are women’s success chances more or less corre-
lated with quality than men’s? The answer to this question may well differ from
what the unconditional success rates of men and women suggest. Employers,
sponsors or other potential discriminators may, for example, favor women over
men overall but reward the quality of women’s applications less than for men; or
they may show the opposite pattern. Allocations and incentives can be severely
influenced by such “slope-discriminating” behavior that may appear on top of
potential “level-effect” discrimination.
A major difficulty for the analyst is to measure the quality of an application. In
most contexts, only proxies for applicant quality are available and their interpre-
tation is often all too flexible. The statistical connection between a given proxy
and quality may be nonlinear (more generally, difficult to capture) and it may be
different for men and women. It may also be subject to differential measurement
error and to selection effects. A substantial portion of these measurement prob-
lems arises simply because the objective function of the potential discriminator
is unknown. For example, job applicants promise a high-dimensional array of
outcomes. It is usually beyond the analyst’s power to assess the potential em-
ployers’ valuations of these outcomes.
In this paper, we focus on a narrow financial context, peer-to-peer lending be-
tween German households on the online platform smava.de. Here, the applicant
is a borrower who describes a project and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to all
potential lenders. To predict the outcome of a loan contract, a potential lender
merely has to assess the anticipated repayment stream. The quality of such a
loan application can therefore be reasonably reduced to a single number: its ex-
pected internal rate of return. We observe all characteristics of the offered con-
tract and of the applicant that are available to the potential lender, allowing us to
assess this measure of predictable quality in detail. We argue that other lender
objectives, over and above the expected internal rate of return, are unimportant
under standard assumptions. The nature of the interaction between lender and
borrower precludes any other relation between them. Risk considerations are
also minimal, due to the platform’s specific insurance mechanism.
Using our inferred measure of quality, we analyze the applicant’s chances of suc-
cess, with a particular focus on the interaction between gender and quality. We
address measurement error by modeling the applicant’s quality with a detailed
structure and by including a statistical correction method (the SIMEX procedure
of Cook and Sefanski, 1994). We find significant effects of both slope discrim-
ination and level discrimination. Women have higher success rates than men,
conditional on quality, but this gender difference is driven by a larger increase
of men’s success rate in quality: women appear to get the benefit of the doubt,
such that low-quality applications of women are almost equally successful as
high-quality applications of women and men. Low-quality applications of men,
in contrast, are much less likely to be successful. In terms of chances of a project
being fully funded, the success of a below-median-quality application by a man
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is about half of that of an analogous application by a woman.
Within the larger literature on discrimination, this result is noteworthy in that it
confirms a particular feature of (some kinds of) statistical discrimination: if the
potential discriminators—here, the predominantly male lenders—find it harder
to judge a woman than to judge a man, then weak male applicants should
have lower success. This feature is usually not found in discrimination stud-
ies, largely because a male-favoring level effect outweighs it. We also show that
simpler proxies of quality yield different conclusions. One natural candidate
proxy for quality is the applicant’s credit rating. Its correlation with success,
like that of our own quality measure, suggests that women enjoy positive level
discrimination in our context, but not a positive slope discrimination. An alter-
native proxy, the nominal interest rate that the applicant offers, shows an even
stronger interaction between gender and quality, such that female applicants do
not benefit from higher quality at all. In this sense, one can read our study as
cautioning that the choice of proxies for quality is highly important for the con-
clusion.
A note on causality is in order. We describe correlations, no more. An advantage
for simple interpretations of our results is that the available control variables
cover essentially all information that is available to the lenders. The lenders
therefore plausibly do not condition their choice on other factors. However, we
cannot rule out that borrower selection on unobservables (such as a borrower’s
previous attempts to secure funding) influences the results.
In the next section, we briefly review the literature on discrimination with a par-
ticular focus on slope discrimination. Section 3 describes our data context and
Section 4 our econometric modelling. Section 5 shows the results and Section 6
concludes.
✷✳ ❉✐s❝r✐♠✐♥❛t✐♦♥ ▲✐t❡r❛t✉r❡✿ ❇r✐❡❢ ❙✉♠♠❛r②
❛♥❞ ❈♦♥♥❡❝t✐♦♥s
As indicated above, we distinguish between level discrimination and slope dis-
crimination. In the extant literature, level discrimination is the much more fre-
quent object of investigation, among the two. It features in studies on differen-
tial chances of getting a job offer depending on one’s race (see e.g. Nunley et
al., 2014), gender (Kuhn and Shen, 2012), religion (Wright et al., 2013), sexual
orientation (Ahmed, Anderson and Hammarstedt, 2013), age (Riach and Rich,
2010) or attractiveness (Rooth, 2009). The discrimination literature is not limited
to hiring decisions, of course, as referee decisions in sport (Price and Wolfers,
2010), bidder’s choices on Ebay (Kricheli-Katz and Regev, 2016), rental market
decisions (Carlsson and Eriksson, 2014) and retail market decisions (Zussman,
2013) have all shown to be prone to level discrimination, too. As for the reasons
for discrimination, the most prominent proposed theories are Becker’s (1957)
taste-based or Phelps’ (1972) and Arrow’s (1973) statistical discrimination (see
also Aigner and Cain, 1977, for influential early work). Between them, it is no-
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table that taste-based discrimination does more straightforwardly predict level
discrimination while the discussion of statistical discrimination much more of-
ten includes predictions of slope discrimination. Especially the sub-literature on
screening discrimination (Cornell and Welch, 1996, and subsequent work) is re-
lated to our study. Its main assumption is that the employer can assess certain
groups of applicants better than other groups. An application by a man may,
e.g., be less punished for its low quality than in the case of a woman. This spe-
cific prediction is, however, essentially unconfirmed in the empirical discrimina-
tion literature (see e.g. the explicit statement in Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga,
2013).
More general than in our context, slope discrimination concerns the differential
valuation of certain achievements, qualifications or characteristics, evidenced
for example in criminal background checks (Pager, 2003) or in the quality of
a resumé (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), both of which can be differently
important for different applicant groups. Pager (2003) shows that a prior con-
viction decreases a white job applicant’s chances for a call-back by half whereas
an African-American ex-convict experiences a reduction in call-back chances by
two-thirds, compared to having no criminal record. Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) show that having a high-quality resumé is less effective for African-American
job applicants than for whites and that the gap between African-American and
Whites increases with resumé quality.1 A possible explanation is that employers
may use screening procedures such as not reading further if the job applicant has
an African-American name. But many differential reactions of employers are, of
course, also in line with Bayesian updating as the information can be differently
informative about the performance on the job. Attributions to a particular mech-
anism are, thus, quite speculative in the absence of a suitable measurement of
applicant quality. The analyzed proxies for quality leave room for interpretation
and one may regard their measurement, and the evidence for their correlations
with the employers’ objectives, as incomplete.
Only few discrimination studies focus on a sophisticated measurement of out-
put productivity. Gallen (2015) uses Danish matched employer-employee data
of five industries to estimate the relative productivity of men and women. The
gender productivity gap is measured by estimating the efficiency units lost in a
firm-level production function for a female worker compared to a male worker,
holding other individual characteristics constant. The study finds that 75% of
the gender wage gap (-0.16) can be explained by gender productivity differences.
Hellerstein et al. (1999) follow a similar methodological path but focus solely on
the manufacturing industry. They find a strikingly large gender pay gap of (-
0.45) but a much more modest productivity gap (-0.16). Azmat and Ferrer (2015)
1While Nunley et al. (2014) replicate Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2004) result that
differential success chances do not decrease between African-American and white
job applicants when additional information about productivity is added to the re-
sumé, Kaas and Manger (2012) find the opposite result, with discrimination of job
applicants with Turkish-sounding names in Germany vanishing when a reference
letter containing productivity information was added to the application.
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look at productivity data of lawyers and find that roughly half of the gender
earnings gap can be explained by productivity differences. From a distance, our
paper’s main difference to this literature is that we focus on loan applications.
We, too, determine a relatively sophisticated quality measure, the expected rate
of return, and ask whether this measure has a different correlation with success
for men and women. This arguably reduces the room for interpretation signifi-
cantly.
Prior research on peer-to-peer credit markets includes studies that focus on the
borrowers’ financial strength (such as credit grade), paid interest, or loan dura-
tion as covariates of funding success (Iyer et al., 2009; Herzenstein et al., 2008;
Avery et al., 2004), studies that focus on personal characteristics such as race,
age, gender, or beauty (Theseira, 2008; Pope and Sydnor, 2008; Ravina, 2008).
Gender is usually just used as a control variable in these studies. In contrast,
Barasinska and Schäfer (2010), which is also the peer-to-peer lending study most
similar to our paper, specifically look for gender discrimination in the same data
of the platform smava.de. Their regression results show no significant relation-
ship between an applicant’s gender and the likelihood of being fully funded.
The fact that we find very different results despite using the same data is another
indication that the method of measuring quality is key in analyses of discrimi-
nation.2
✸✳ ❚❤❡ P❡❡r✲t♦✲P❡❡r ▲❡♥❞✐♥❣ Pr♦❝❡ss
✸✳✶✳ P❛rt✐❝✐♣❛t✐♦♥ ❛♥❞ ■♥❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥ ❈♦♥❞✐t✐♦♥s
The data set consists of loan applications posted between March 2007 and March
2010 on the German platform smava.de.3 In contrast to traditional bank lend-
ing, peer-to-peer lending refers to direct lending between private persons. The
platform sets the rules according to which the lending process is carried out
and supplies the infrastructure of the web-based intermediation procedure. Al-
though funds are exchanged (almost) directly between persons no further com-
munication between peers is possible. Borrowing and lending is carried out
anonymously. Informational asymmetries are high since investors have only ac-
cess to a limited set of verified information provided by the platform.
In order to participate in the lending process, be it as lender or as borrower,
adult members of Germany’s general population can register at smava.de and
verify their identity via the “postident” procedure administered by the German
postal service provider. smava.de requests personal information such as one’s
name, gender, age and place of residence, of which only age and gender are
published on the platform in an uncensored way. Borrowers and lenders choose
2Other studies using the online lending platform smava.de as data source are Barasin-
ska (2011), Kraus (2013), and Pötzsch and Böhme (2010).
3The data are suitable for our purposes only until March 2010, whereafter a loan appli-
cation can involve joint liability of two persons living in the same household, with
only aggregated financial information being shown on the platform.
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a username and the user’s address is opacitized in the sense that only the federal
state of residence is published.
The platform also collects financial information of potential borrowers to infer
their “Schufa rating” and “KDF indicator”, both being published on the plat-
form. The Schufa rating is the main German credit rating for individuals, issued
by the German national credit bureau. It reflects a person’s default risk on a
scale from A (lowest risk) to M (highest risk). The KDF indicator measures a
person’s financial burden from outstanding consumer loans ranging between 1
(lowest financial burden) and 4 (highest financial burden).4
The available verified information is complemented by voluntary provided un-
verified information. That is, on the platform one can chose one of several cat-
egories indicating one’s employment status and, after a successful registration,
one can voluntarily upload a profile picture and write a text describing oneself
in greater detail.
Registrants at smava.de have to be older than 18 years and must permanently re-
side in Germany. A person can register only either as lender or as borrower, not
as both. For eligibility to borrow, one must prove a monthly income of e 1000 at
least, a Schufa rating that is no worse than category H and a debt-to-disposable
income ratio no higher than 67%.
✸✳✷✳ ❚❤❡ ❚❡r♠s ❖❢ ❆♥ ■♥✈❡st♠❡♥t
A successfully registered borrower can post a loan application that describes the
requested loan amount (in multiples of e 500 with a maximum of e 50.000), the
term of the loan (either 36 or 60 months), the annual interest rate he or she is
willing to pay (in multiples of 0.1 percentage points), the purpose of the loan
(an unverified choice from a fixed list of 17 categories) and a voluntary added
text providing further (unverified) details about the loan application.
Based on the observable loan and borrower specific information a potential lender
can decide whether or not to invest in a given loan application. A possible in-
vestment has to be in multiples of e 250 and must not exceed the requested total
loan amount or e 25.000.5 In contrast to other peer-to-peer lending platforms
such as Prosper.com where loans are auctioned, smava.de works on a first-come-
first-served basis. As soon as the requested loan amount equals the aggregated
supply of funding, or after 14 days, the loan application is closed. Lenders can
not underbid each other. However, loan applicants can raise the offered interest
rate during the bidding period to attract more funding. The final rate is the ef-
4The specific calculations used by smava.de are as follows. The sum of all monthly
payments to loans (including loans from smava.de) is divided by the monthly dis-
posable income (without savings), resulting in the debt-to-disposable income ratio.
This measure is assigned to categories from 1 to 4, constituting the KDF indicator.
The relevant information as well as the indicator are continuously updated. Debt
payments, income, and savings are not observable for other peers apart from the
summary in the KDF indicator.
5Most investors provide only a small fraction of the requested loan amount so that
loans are usually financed by many different investors.
6
fective rate for all lenders.
If less than 25% of the requested amount are funded after the loan is closed, the
application is withdrawn from the platform and the received bids (if any) are
transferred back to the lenders. In this case, the potential borrower can change
the terms of the loan application and post a modified application.
If the supplied loan amount covers at least 25% of the requested sum, lenders
are contractually bound to realize their bids accordingly. Upon acceptance of
the funds by the loan applicant the loan contract is legally valid. After a legal
loan contract is achieved, smava.de charges lenders and the borrower a fee.6
✸✳✸✳ ❚❤❡ ❘✐s❦ ❖❢ ❆♥ ■♥✈❡st♠❡♥t
After a loan is paid out, the borrower is contractually bound to repay the funds
in constant monthly annuities. A borrower can repay early but, in this case, has
to compensate the lenders for the missed interest payments. If a borrower fails
to repay, lenders incur a loss.7 That is, loans arranged by smava.de are not se-
cured by collateral or third parties. But two insurance mechanisms apply. First,
the claim to the resulting debt from a default is sold to a collecting agency which,
if successful, recovers an average share of roughly 20% of the missed payments
for the investors. Second, and more importantly, a risk sharing mechanism is in-
stalled, functioning as follows. Risk sharing is effective via loan pools. Lenders
are pooled by two characteristics of the loans they have invested in: the loans’
Schufa ratings and their durations until maturity. For example, all lenders who
put their money in loan applications with a repayment duration of 60 months
and a Schufa rating “B” are assigned to one pool. With two different loan du-
rations and eight applicable Schufa ratings, the grouping results in a total of
16 different pools. The monthly principal re-payments are aggregated within
each of the pools and each lender receives a share proportional to his or her rel-
ative investment in the respective pool. If a loan defaults, the resulting loss is
subtracted from the pooled re-payments. Thus, each member of the pool par-
tially compensates for the loss. The resulting re-payment rates per pool range
from 99% for pools of loans with Schufa rating A to 84% for those with a Schufa
rating H.8 Interest payments are exempt from the pooling procedure and trans-
ferred directly to the investors if the loan did not default in the previous month.
Overall, the risk sharing mechanism essentially insures against the loss of prin-
cipal, at the cost of the effective pay-out lying below the nominal interest rate.
6The structure of the fees for borrowers and investors has been change by smava.de
once during the period that is relevant for our study. Prior to February 2009, there
was no fee for lenders and borrowers paid simply 1% of the borrowed amount.
Afterwards, lenders were charged e 4 per bid and borrowers 2% of the borrowed
amount (or at least e 40) for loans with a 36 month duration and 2.5% (or at least
e 40) for loans with 60 months duration. We account for this change in our loan
return calculations and in our regressions via fixed effects.
7A failure of repayment is declared as soon as the monthly payment is 60 days late.
8The data represent historical average payment rates over the period from April 2007
to January 2010, published by smava.de.
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As we show in the next section, more than 80% of completed contracts show re-
payments that corresponds to an internal rate of return lying within the interval
[0.05, 0.1] and the remaining 20% all lie within the interval [-0.05, 0.2]. We re-
gard the distribution of repayments as small enough to justify an analysis under
the assumption of investor risk neutrality: a lender’s main challenge is to iden-
tify the probability of default, which would induce a loss of interest payments
from the time of default onwards. Expected-utility calculations under standard
assumptions confirm that risk considerations can be neglected.9
✸✳✹✳ ❚❤❡ ❉❛t❛
Our data set consists of 4144 closed loan applications submitted by 3400 bor-
rowers, including the online-published personal and financial information of
the borrowers.
On average 73% of the loan applicants are male, with one half living in the north-
ern states of Germany. Average borrower age is 44 and the mean requested
sum is roughly e 8.000, offered at an average nominal 9.9% annual interest. The
distribution over the 4 KDF-indicator categories is 1:17%, 2:24%, 3:33%, 4:26%.
The distribution of individual borrowers’ Schufa ratings is A:15%, B:16%, C:9%,
D:10%, E:11%, F:12%, G:16%, H:11%.
At the end of our observational period, 5671 lenders were registered on the plat-
form and submitted on average 10 funding decisions. Only 625 (11%) of lenders
are female, precluding us from performing a meaningful interaction of our anal-
ysis with lender gender. The exact descriptives are shown in Table 1.
✹✳ ❊♠♣✐r✐❝❛❧ ❙tr❛t❡❣②
In the following, we analyze whether and how lenders evaluate loan applica-
tions differently for male versus female applicants. For exposition, we start
by presenting two null hypotheses that describe lender behavior as aiming at
maximal expected returns, conditional on the variables that are observable to
him or her. The main idea behind these hypotheses is that if we were to in-
clude a perfect measurement of an application’s quality as a control, then lender
behavior should not show any partial effects of applicant gender. (While our
measurement is not perfect, we argue that the measurement error is small and
9For example, consider as a benchmark a lender who evaluates a safe 1-period invest-
ment of e 8000 (the empirical average of requested loans in our data set) that repays
at an interest of 6.6% (the empirical average of realized internal rate of return). To in-
vestigate the potential importance of risk aversion, consider increasing the pay-out
variance from zero to the maximal extent that is possible such that (i) the expected
return is held constant and (ii) the possible return realizations are within the range
observed in our data set. Under a log utility evaluation, such an increase in risk af-
fects the investor’s expected utility by less than half of what a one-percentage-point
reduction in the safe interest rate (down to 5.6%) would inflict. In other words, even
an unrealistically high degree of risk would have minuscule effects on lenders’ ex-
pected utility.
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correctable, see Subsection 4.3.) Deviations from these nulls allow multiple in-
terpretations, including the possibility of taste-based discrimination or differen-
tial consideration of information about male versus female applicants. But they
rule out statistical discrimination in combination with rational expectations.10
In specific, we ask: “Is there a significant correlation between the received fund-
ing and a loan applicant’s gender?” (Hypothesis 1, on level discrimination) and
“Does the correlation between expected return and received funding differ by
the applicant gender?” (Hypothesis 2, on slope discrimination).
To measure a loan application’s quality, we use the expected internal rate of re-
turn conditional on the available information, E(IRR). We describe this measure
in detail in Subsection 4.2. The dependent variable of the analysis is a loan appli-
cation’s received funding share, categorized in the three relevant categories that
the platform imposes, {category 1 - funding <25%, category 2 - funding ≥25%
and <100%, category 3 - funding =100%}.11 We fit their incidence in an ordered
logit frame work, see Subsection 4.1). Using the βX coefficient estimators of ex-
planatory variable X in these regressions, we formulate our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. A loan applicant’s gender is not related to funding success, i.e., βGender =
0.
Hypothesis 2. A loan application’s interaction of expected return with the applicant’s
gender is not related to funding success, i.e., βGender*E(IRR) = 0.
✹✳✶✳ ❖r❞❡r❡❞ ▲♦❣✐t
In our econometric specification we model each loan application i as being of
perceived utility Ui to the aggregate pool of investors at smava.de. We assume
that the observable attributes of a loan application determine Ui according to
Ui = β
′
xi + ǫi (1)
where xi are loan application i’s observable attributes, β
′
contains the coefficients
of these attributes and ǫi is a random disturbance term (with a standard logistic
distribution in our application).
To capture equation (1) econometrically, we use the ordered logit framework.
We define a variable Yi ∈ {1,2,3} that measures the funded share of a loan ap-
plication in three observable categories, as described above. The categorization
10Under the assumption that lenders aim at maximal subjectively expected returns, the
deviations must stem from false subjective expectations that may depend on the
applicant’s gender. See Weizsäcker (2010) for analogous tests of rational expectations
for different types of information sets in social learning experiments.
11We have more fine-grained information on the extent of funding but since almost 90%
of the loan applications received either 100% of the requested amount or nothing at
all, a finer analysis makes little difference.
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depends on whether Ui passes a threshold κm, with m = 1,2. The parameter




1 + exp(Xiβ − κm)
. (2)
✹✳✷✳ ❊①♣❡❝t❡❞ ❘❡t✉r♥ ❈❛❧❝✉❧❛t✐♦♥
A loan’s expected internal rate of return (irr) is unobservable, both for us and
lenders, and we therefore use the available loan and borrower specific infor-
mation to come up with an estimate. For each loan there exist T + 1 different
outcome scenarios, with T being the total number of monthly payments during
the repayment period. The possible scenarios range from an immediate default
before the first payment is due to a complete repayment as planned.12
Each of the possible outcome scenarios occurs with a certain probability. The
probability that the borrower defaults in the first month is denoted p1 = Pr{D =
1}, with D as a discrete random variable indicating the month of default, and
analogously for defaults in other months, up to the best case scenario being
pT+1 = 1 − Pr{D ≤ T}. These probabilities are unknown but can be estimated
based on past defaults of borrowers in our data set. We estimate the default
risks of all months, p1...pT+1 with a discrete time hazard model, using as ex-
planatory variables the observable characteristics of the borrower and the terms
of the loan. With the help of this information, for each loan we calculate how
likely each possible default scenario occurs.13
Next, we use the contractual repayment structure of smava.de to determine the
monetary values of each possible outcome scenario. All loans are annuity loans,
i.e., repayments consist of a principal repayment part and an interest payment
part. Due to the collective insurance mechanism implemented by smava.de (de-
scribed in Subsection 3.3), lenders receive an insured part of the principal repay-
ments no matter whether the borrower defaults or not.14 Overall, repayment of
a loan that defaults in month D is









with Ratepool as the insured fraction of the annuity repayments. Using the payoff
we can solve for the irr for each of the possible outcome scenarios. It is given by
12It is not possible to leave out a certain monthly repayment and continue repaying
later on. If a borrower defaults once, it’s over.
13For further details see Appendix A.1.
14As described above, the degree of insurance depends on the investment pool that the
investor belongs to. At the time of investment investors do not know the precise
default rate in their pool, mainly as it may vary over time. smava.de publishes a con-
tinuously updated estimate of the pool-specific default rate and in our calculation
we make the simplifying assumption that the ensured part is known to be constant
at this level.
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solving the condition for a break-even flow of payments,




Payo f f (D)t
(1 + irr)t
, (4)
where Investment is the amount invested, Fee is the amount charged for using
the platform and Payo f f (D)t is the is the part of Payo f f (D) received in period
t.
The expected internal rate of return to an investment, E(irr), is the sum of the
possible returns irrt that would arise from the possible T + 1 outcome scenarios





pt × irrt, (5)
with E(IRR) = 12 × E(irr) as the annual return measure. Figure 1 illustrates the












Figure 1: Density of E(IRR) over the posted loan applications in our data
set, with the horizontal dashed line indicating the mean return
at 6.6%.
✹✳✸✳ ❈♦rr❡❝t✐♥❣ ❢♦r ▼❡❛s✉r❡♠❡♥t ❊rr♦r
Incorporating likely quantities of not directly observable variables in an econo-
metric analysis comprises the risk of biased results, an unreliable coverage level
of confidence intervals and a reduction of statistical power due to measurement
error. To account for measurement error, the literature proposes different ap-
proaches;15 the simulation-extrapolation method (SIMEX) developed by Cook and
15This includes the semi-parametric correction technique by Sepanski et al. (1994), the
two-stage bootstrap method by Haukka (1995), the regression splines approach of
11
Stefanski (1994) is the most appropriate method for our setting, due to its ro-
bustness to distributional assumptions, its applicability to relatively small sam-
ples and its performance in several simulation studies (see, e.g., Later, Fung and
Krewski (1999)). SIMEX allows retrieving asymptotically unbiased and efficient
estimates for regression based models.
The method requires, importantly, an estimate of the measurement error vari-
ance (or, as in our case, of the estimation error variance), σ2u . Since we construct
the quality measure ourselves, we know the measurement process which is (po-
tentially) subject to estimation error and can use a Monte-Carlo approach to ar-
rive at the estimate.16
Equipped with an estimate of the measurement error, the basic idea of the SIMEX
method is fairly straightforward: if a causal relationship is biased by measure-
ment error, then adding more measurement error should increase the degree of
this bias. That is, the measurement error variance σ2u is increased to (1 + Γ)σ
2
u
where Γ controls the amount of added measurement error. By adding (or sim-
ulating) successive levels of measurement error, one can therefore estimate the
empirical relationship between the expected value of the coefficient and Γ, and
then extrapolate back to the unbiased estimate. That is, for different values of
Γ = (0.5,1,1.5,2) we create b = 1, ..., B pseudo data sets via simulations
˜E(IRR)b,i = ˜E(IRR)i +
√
ΓNormal(0,σ2u)b,i (6)
where ˜E(IRR) = E(IRR)+ u and u ∼ N(0,σ2u), with E(IRR) as the true value. Then
we refit the pseudo data to obtain the bth pseudo estimate
θ̂b(Γ) = θ̂({Yi, ˜E(IRR)b,i}n1) (7)






We then write the estimates as a function of Γ and since Γ =−1 is the case of no
measurement error, the extrapolating back to Γ = −1 estimates the parameter
for this case.17 The employed extrapolation function is a quadratic polynomial
Berry et al. (2002), the regression calibration method by Hardin et al. (2003), the
so-called indirect method by Jiang and Turnbull (2004) and the adjusted estimator of
Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
16We re-estimate our measure with different parameter specifications which we ran-
domly sample from their confidence intervals that are estimated from our data set
(see Appendix A.1). This accounts for the uncertainty in the employed parameter
estimates, which might result in measurement error. The resulting data allows us
to estimate the variance parameter(s) of the estimation error of our quality measure.
We estimate the mean estimation error variance for the full sample and individually
for each loan application. The reported results below use the former, full-sample
estimator to run the SIMEX analysis. None of the conclusions change qualitatively
if we use the individual-loan estimators.
17Although the SIMEX approach with its simulation character seems a natural fit for
the bootstrap to obtain standard errors of the SIMEX-parameter estimates, for com-
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which is usually the default setting in most statistical packages and has a good
performance in many cases.
✺✳ ❘❡s✉❧ts
Towards assessing Hypotheses 1 and 2, we first give a short data overview and
then estimate the above-described ordinal logit model and apply the SIMEX cor-
rection.18 Finally, we compare our choice of explanatory variables with natural
other candidates.
✺✳✶✳ ❉❛t❛ ❖✈❡r✈✐❡✇
Female loan applicants get on average 2.7% more of their requested loan amount
funded then males (Two-sample t test, p-value<0.001). There are, however,
many other characteristics of a loan application besides applicant gender that
could explain this finding. Table 1 gives a descriptive overview of the main
variables that we observe, separated by gender. It shows that female loan appli-
cants offer on average higher interest rates, request lower amounts, have higher
(better) Schufa ratings and are older than male applicants.
Loan/Borrower Characteristics Female Male
E(IRR) in % 6.70 6.60
Offered Loan Rate in % 10.14 9.78∗∗∗
Loan Duration in months 50.34 49.92
Requested Loan amount in 1000e 7.47 8.17∗∗∗
Schufa Rating in Scores from 1-8 4.51 4.36∗∗
KDF Rating in Scores from 1-4 2.69 2.69
Borrower Age in Years 47.01 43.21∗∗∗
Borrower Residence in North Germany in % 50.01 49.30
Length of Project Description in Letters 395.04 371.57∗∗
No. of Observations 1114 3030
Lender Characteristics Female Male
Lender Age in Years 45.33 41.49∗∗∗
Lender Residence in North Germany in % 30.08 32.69∗
No. of Observations 625 5046
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : < 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : < 1% (one-sided)
Table 1: Two-sample data average and t test results for average gender
differences of borrowers and lenders.
plex models like ours it is simply not feasible. We instead use the jackknife method
developed by Stefanski and Cook (1995) which has a much smaller computational
burden and has shown to deliver valid estimates in simulations.
18The ordinal logit model is estimated with the polr procedure using the mass package
in R and implemented in a modified version of the current simex R package (see, e.g.,




We specify three different econometric models and estimate each of them with
and without measurement error correction by means of SIMEX. Model (1) sim-
ply controls for a loan applicant’s gender with the dummy variable borrowermale
valued 1 if the respective person is male and zero otherwise. Model (2) ad-
ditionally accounts for the loan application’s expected return by means of the
mean centered variable E(IRR) and its interaction effect with the gender variable
(borrowermale∗ E(IRR)). Model (3) adds further controls and their respective in-
teractions E(IRR): the applicant’s age borrowerage (which is a mean centered con-
tinuous variable) and place of residence borrowernorth (a dummy variable valued
1 if the respective person lives in one of the northern part of Germany, and zero
otherwise).19 Moreover, Model (3) includes controls for all other variables that
we were able to cleanly extract from out data set: the requested loan amount,
the loan rate, the (categorical) purpose of the loan, the loan applicant’s Schufa
rating, the loan applicant’s KDF indicator, the loan applicant’s occupation, the
length of the loan description and smava.de’s fee structure. Table 2 list the results.
19We define the two geographical areas such that the number of inhabitants and the
economic output are approximately equal in both clusters. Federal states assigned
to the northern part of Germany are Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, Schleswig Holstein,
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, and
Northrhine-Westphalia while the remaining federal states form the southern part.
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Dependent Variable: share_ f unded



































Fixed Effects No No Yes
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : < 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : < 1%
Fixed effects and κ coefficients are reported in Table 3 in the appendix.
Table 2: Ordinal logit results with (below) and without (above) correction
for measurement error via the SIMEX method.
Hypothesis 1 - level effect: All model specifications exhibit a negative coef-
ficient for a loan applicant being male. However, only for the two Model (1)
versions is this correlation strongly significant while for Model (2) and Model
(3), at most a marginal significance is detected. In Model (1) it could obviously
be the case that gender picks up the influence of other variables, like higher
E(IRR), consistent with the gender differences reported in Table 1. Controlling
for E(IRR) in the saturated Model (2) and adding various other controls in Model
(3) does not change the the sign of the gender coefficient but reduces its signifi-
cance. Overall, the results of model estimations with and without measurement
15
error correction do not allow us to fully reject the null of Hypothesis 1 but at
least cast serious doubt at its validity. Women appear to be at an advantage
overall, in our data set.
Hypothesis 2 - slope effect: The evidence of a significant interaction between
quality and gender is much stronger. For all of our model specifications does the
coefficient for the interaction term between gender and E(IRR) show a positive
sign at a strong significance both in the case of no measurement error correction
and after a SIMEX application. The SIMEX correction increases the size of main
effects and interaction effects of E(IRR).20
For Model (2), the gender difference in the importance of E(IRR) is so strong that
the coefficient of women’s E(IRR) is only marginally significant and vanishes if
measurement error controls are omitted. In other words, the application’s pre-
dictable quality is a much better indicator of the funding probability for men
than for women. Thus, the regression results allow us to reject Hypothesis 2.
A natural interpretation is that the effect reflects irrational expectations, as indi-
cated in the literature of statistical discrimination and screening discrimination:
The predominantly male lenders have a worse understanding of women than of
men and therefore can identify low-quality men but not low-quality women.
Our data allow us further to check for slope effects of two other borrower charac-
teristics with a discrimination potential: a borrower’s age and place of residence.
While the expected return is not evaluated differently for borrowers living in the
north or south of Germany, a borrower’s age seems to matter. The coefficient for
the interaction with E(IRR) in SIMEX-Model (3) shows a significant negative ef-
fect. The size of the predicted age effect is, however, clearly smaller than the
gender difference even if a change of one standard deviation in age (13.6 years)
is considered. Further analogous estimations of SIMEX-Model (2) for the two
variables confirm these findings (see Table 4 in Appendix B).
Using the predicted values from SIMEX-Model (2), Figure 2 graphically summa-
rizes our findings regarding gender discrimination at smava.de. For loan appli-
cations in the +/- 5-percentage-point range around the average of expected re-
turns, the likelihood of funding success and the E(IRR) measure correlate much
stronger if the application was submitted by a man rather than by a woman.
This difference vanishes for loan applications with expected returns exceeding
the sample average by more than 5 percentage points. However, the relevance
of this group for our analysis is limited since it accounts for only 1% of our data
set.
20This is not surprising since the SIMEX approach eliminates some of the noise due to
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Figure 2: Predicted values for gender differences in the probability of full
funding over expected return deviations from the mean.
✺✳✸✳ ❈♦♠♣❛r✐s♦♥ ♦❢ ❝❛♥❞✐❞❛t❡ ♣r♦①✐❡s ❢♦r q✉❛❧✐t②
We close our empirical analysis by comparing our measure of quality, E(IRR),
with other possible proxies of an application’s quality. Would our conclusions
change if one uses different to measures of applicant quality? The following fig-
ures indicate that the answer is affirmative. As a benchmark, Figure 3 depicts
the predicted values of Model (2), i.e. using the same explanatory variables as
in Figure 2 but without the SIMEX correction.21 Comparisons of the two figures
shows that both reveal the same qualitative insights but that the positive slope
for men’s E(IRR) is stronger with the SIMEX correction. In contrast, for Figure
4, the role of E(IRR) is taken by another natural candidate for a quality proxy,
namely the offered loan rate that is contained in the description of an offer. With
this measure of quality, one would arrive at the conclusion that females are, if
anything, harmed by offering higher quality. The gender difference in the rela-
tion between quality and funding success would thus be even bigger than when
using E(IRR) as a quality measure (coefficients: loan_rate (-0.002), borrower_sex
(-0.505*), interaction term (0.030)) . Figure 4 uses yet another measure of qual-
ity, the Schufa credit rating. Here, we detect no slope difference across genders
at all, only a level effect appears (coefficients: Schu f a (-0.116**), borrower_sex
(-0.141), interaction term (-0.016)).
In sum, the comparison of the different quality measures serves as a robustness
check but also as a warning: while the rough pattern of results may be similar,
the interpretation may change significantly depending on the choice of quality
controls. Additionally, the significance of the gender level effect depends on the
21For the other two measures of quality that we study, the SIMEX correction is unavail-
able and we therefore take Figure 3 as a benchmark.
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model specification. While the borrower_sex coefficient is negative for all three
specifications only for the offered loan rate measure does it show to be signif-
icant. This makes it even more pressing to measure the quality or value of an
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Figure 3: Predicted values for gender differences in the probability of full





























Figure 4: Predicted values for gender differences in the probability of full






























Figure 5: Predicted values for gender differences in the probability of full
funding over Schufa rating.
✻✳ ❈♦♥❝❧✉s✐♦♥
The paper makes mainly methodological contributions in that it discusses in
novel ways that the choice of proxy for applicant quality, and its measurement,
play a role in the conclusions that one may draw from empirical analyses of dis-
crimination contexts. Of course we are aware that the paper’s substance, not
the method, may be of primary interest to most readers. The finding that low-
quality applications of men are penalized more than those of women has imme-
diate analogues to many other contexts, and is in line with the straightforward
predictions of statistical discrimination: men can judge men better than they can
judge women and this is bad for weak male applicants.
Our choice of data context, peer-to-peer lending, has specific and noteworthy
characteristics. First, the “rules of the game” are transparent, not only to the
agents but also to the analyst. Especially the fact that the information conditions
are highly controlled is a key advantage in order to detect gender differences
while controlling for key information on the applications’ qualities. Second, the
context is very different from, e.g., labor market contexts in terms of the pre-
vailing stereotypes and tastes regarding the two genders. Although it is hard
to compare across settings, one may find it plausible that an investor who uses
peer-to-peer lending has a much more positive view of female loan applicants,
compared to an employer’s view of female job applicants. We agree to this and
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❆✳ ❆♣♣❡♥❞✐① ❆
❆✳✶✳ ❉❡❢❛✉❧t Pr♦❜❛❜✐❧✐t② ❊st✐♠❛t✐♦♥
❆✳✶✳✶✳ ❉✐s❝r❡t❡ ❚✐♠❡ ❍❛③❛r❞ ▼♦❞❡❧
We denote D as the random variable indicating the time period of a loan’s de-
fault, with values d1<d2<d3<..., and write the default probabilities as p(dj) =
Pr{D = dj}. We then define a loan’s survival function at a specific dj as the
probability that the loan didn’t default until D ≥ dj resulting in S(dj) = Pr{D ≥
dj}= ∑D≥dj p(dj). Next, we define the discrete time hazard rate, h(dj), as a loan’s
conditional probability of defaulting at time dj given the loan hasn’t defaulted
up to that point, so that




To estimate the discrete time hazard rate conditional on our observable loan
characteristics and the current time period, we follow Cox (1972) and use the
logistic hazard model approach. The model is fitted by running a logistic re-
gression on a set of pseudo observations generated from our original data set.
That is, we generate default indicators yij that are valued 1 if loan i defaulted
at time j and zero other wise. This results in a number of default indicators per
loan that is equal to the number of actually observed monthly payments of that
loan. Each of these generated indicators is merged with the loan specific covari-
ates, xi, and a consecutively numbered time index j. Since Pr{yij = 1|D ≥ dj}=
Pr{D = dj|D ≥ dj}= hi(dj) the hazard rate can be estimated with the help of the
usual maximum likelihood procedures in a binary response data case, with the









yijlog(hi(dj, Xi)) + (1 − yij)log(1 − hi(dj, Xi))
]
, (10)
where the hazard rate is assumed to have a logistic functional form. The loan
specific characteristics such as requested loan amount, offered loan rate, loan
duration, loan purpose as well as the borrower characteristics age, gender, sch-
ufa rating, financial burden, employment status and place of residence are cap-






(1 − ĥi(dj, Xi)) (11)
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Figure 6: Evolution paths of the survival probability over time for all
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Figure 7: Evolution paths of the survival probability over time for all





Dependent Variable: share_ f unded













schu f aB -0.683∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.15)
schu f aC -0.245 0.074
(0.22) (0.25)
schu f aD -1.196∗∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.26)
schu f aE -1.244∗∗∗ -0.861∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.27)
schu f aF -1.706∗∗∗ -1.107∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.35)
schu f aG -2.236∗∗∗ -1.291∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.34)
schu f aH -2.640∗∗∗ -1.305∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.41)
kd f 2 -0.518∗∗∗ -0.648∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.41)
kd f 3 -1.211∗∗∗ -1.358∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
















Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : < 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : < 1%
Table 3: Fixed effects.
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SIMEX-Model(1) SIMEX-Model(2) SIMEX-Model(3)















Fixed Effects No No No
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : < 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : < 1%
Table 4: Ordinal logit results with correction for measurement error via
the SIMEX method.
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